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Abstract
One poorly investigated issue in organizational agility is the question how organizations
change their speed while adopting and exploiting new IT capability. In this paper we outline
a theory of software development agility that draws upon a model of IT innovations by
Swanson and on Marchâs learning theory and in particular on his concepts of exploration
and exploitation. We explore how both exploration and exploitation as organizational
learning modes can software development agility. We propose a sequential model of
organizational learning in which agility is driven by different factors during different stages
â exploration vs. exploitation- of organizational learning. We show that software
development agility is influenced by the external demands, the diffusion level and rate of the
IT innovation, its radicalness, and the organizationsâ needs to balance multiple conflicting
process goals including speed, quality, cost, risk and innovative content. We illustrate the
value of the model by exploring how seven software organizations controlled the demands
for increased agility i.e. their development speed or over a period of five years (1999-2004),
and how they balanced the need for the increased agility with other critical development
criteria like cost, risk, quality and innovative content. In conclusion, we discuss the
implications of our findings for future research on agility and related management practices.
Keywords: Agility, IT innovation, Radical nature, Exploration, Exploitation, Ambidexterity,
Process features
Permanent URL: http://sprouts.aisnet.org/4-10
Copyright: Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works License
Reference: Lyytinen, K., Rose, G.M. (2004). "How Agile is Agile Enough? Towards A
Theory of Agility in Software Development," Case Western Reserve University, USA .
Sprouts: Working Papers on Information Systems, 4(10). http://sprouts.aisnet.org/4-10
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/4-10
LYYTINEN &ROSE/ THEORY OF AGILITY IN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
How Agile is Agile Enough? 





 Agility can be defined as the quality of being quick-moving and nimble. In software 
development agility can be defined as the ability of a system developer to sense and respond 
to new technical and business opportunities in order to stay innovative and competitive in a 
turbulent and quickly changing business environment. An agile software development 
organization (one that demonstrates agility) has thus the capabilities and processes in place to 
respond to unexpected environmental changes both in the technology and in the business 
environment.   
 In the past the software and system development literature has mainly sought to 
control and explain the outcome quality / reliability of software processes. The main driver in 
this endeavor was to submit to virtues of good system engineering: the final technical system 
must be flawless, user friendly, scalable or portable. This logic pervaded debates around 
“software crisis” in the early 70’s and has since then motivated the development of rigorous 
software development approaches including structured programming, and structured 
methodologies (Lyytinen 1987).  The downside of these approaches is that they incur high 
coordination, documentation and learning costs. The same logic motivated later on much of 
the process improvement research in which the low level of errors and process repeatability 
were the driving goals (Humphrey 1989, Curtis et al 1992). Most researchers in these camps 
approached development speed with an assumption that it was relatively constant while the 
outcome quality mattered. Therefore, agility was not a goal to aspire in software 
development.1   
This model faced significant challenge when the rebels of the new economy and 
skunk works of web development in the 90’s changed the idea of “good” system 
development: software had to be developed in markets and for the markets with extremely 
fast pace. “Internet speed” became mot dú jour (see .e.g., Cusumano and Yoffie 1999,  
Lyytinen and Rose 2003a, 2003b, Baskerville et al. 2001, Pressman 1998, Carstensen and 
Vogelsang 1999). For the first time the focus in software development was on agility- speed 
truly mattered. This was viewed to be a necessity in order to harness the disruptive potential 
of Internet computing (Lyytinen and Rose 2003a). A great portion of process research in 
software development during the last five years assumes that speed is desirable (see e.g. 
Cusumano and Yoffie D. 1999, Turk et al 2004, Henderson-Sellars and Serour 2004): the key 
to competitiveness as it enables to compete in time. Moreover, such focus on agility echoes 
well with pivotal research in strategy on hyper-competition and dynamic capability (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, D'aveni 1994) 
as well as studies in rapid product development (Menon et al 2002, Kessler and Bierly 2002,  
Kessler and Chakrabarti 1999, Kessler and Chakrabarti 1996).  
Though the connection of increased speed to stronger competitiveness appears to be 
clear during hyper-competition (D’Aveni 1994) it is not clear what agility in software 
development truly means: is it the speed at which some type of running system is available 
for evaluation?; or is it the change in ratio between delivered functionality (in LOC, function 
points etc) and the elapsed time?, or is it the increased velocity of the client to adopt the 
software? It is clear that all these speeds are distinct aspects of “agility” in relation to 
                                                          
1 At the same time the research on programmer productivity and even team productivity showed significant 
variation in individual and team productivity that was due to individual differences and team organization. 
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software. They also have quite different ramifications for how to increase agility. Another set 
of research issues relate to the organizational and technological antecedents of agility, and to 
what extent the organization can truly manipulate them. For example, there is a huge 
difference in changing the speed in doing X faster when compared to changing the speed in 
which the organization moves from doing X to doing Z. Researchers and managers alike 
must also understand how agility (if and when being manipulated) relates to process 
outcomes like innovative content, risk, quality and cost (e.g. Baskerville et al 2001). Finally, 
there is a dearth of knowledge how agility varies during technology diffusion and maturation. 
For example, much of the hype around internet speed was explained by the revolutionary 
technological capability- increased agility followed as the new technology enabled to do 
things faster. Yet, it remains unclear are such relative changes in speed sustainable, or will 
our perception of agility change just when the technology capability changes dramatically 
(Lambe and Spekman 1997).  
In this paper our goal is to address some of these issues. We will develop a model that 
seeks to explain differences in types of agility that software organizations seek to achieve at 
different stages of technology diffusion. We show that the need to agility must be balanced in 
relation to other desirable process features like innovative content, risk, quality and cost. We 
will seek to validate the developed model by analyzing a longitudinal data set (5 year period) 
describing software development practices and outcomes in seven software development 
organizations that adopted Internet computing2. Findings show that studied organizations 
changed their perceptions of agility and their need for it as they sought to balance agility in 
relation to innovative content, cost, quality and risk. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 formulates the development agility model and reviews the related 
literature in software agility research and organizational learning. Section 3 describes the 
field study, while section 4 reports main findings of the longitudinal field study.  The paper 
will conclude by noting remaining research challenges and discussing managerial 
implications.   
 
 
Related Literature and Software Development Agility Model 
 
The goal of the software development agility model is to detect dependencies between 
specific environmental, organizational and market factors that affect how agility relates to 
other process factors and how it can be manipulated by software organizations. The model 
draws on Swanson’s model of IT innovation (Swanson 1994, Lyytinen and Rose 2003b) and 
March’s exploration / exploitation dichotomy (March 1991) According to the model software 
organizations engage both in exploration and exploitation while innovating with IT.  During 
periods of fast technological transition (e.g. shift to Internet computing) the exploration speed 
(absorptive capability of technical potential) and development speed (fast exploitation) must 
be combined to harness the new technology.  Yet, exploration and exploitation set up 
contradicting demands for agility.  Before embarking to develop the model we will shortly 
review the current state of the art in agile software development. 
 
Research on Development Speed and Agility 
During the current years we have seen the advent of a significant stream of research 
on agile software development methods advocated under such acronyms as Extreme 
                                                          
2 The concept of Internet computing involves a relatively broad and evolving set of distributed computing 
models and solutions that rely on open, ubiquitous networks and associated sets of protocols and services. It 
draws upon models of computing that operate within open, heterogeneous, and distributed computing 
environments. (see Lyytinen and Rose 2003a, 2003b) 
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Programming, SCRUM, adaptive software development, or Agile Unified process among 
others (Turk et al 2004, Henderson-Sellars 2004). These methods assume that software 
processes can be organized for faster and more economic delivery of high quality software 
that meets the needs of the customer. The main focus here is on adopting process and 
organizational changes that improve communication, decrease administrative overhead, and 
submit to early and consistent focus on developing code by a team of software developers 
often organized in pairs (Agile alliance 2002).  Empirical studies show that software 
processes gain agility in two ways: 1) developers shorten times between systems releases and 
get the running system up fast (e.g. Extreme programming Turk et al. 2004), and 2) they 
deliver faster the same functionality (Baskerville et al. 2001; Lyytinen and Rose 2003a).  
There are however, few studies which explore how faster product releases and faster 
development times affect, or are influenced by other types of agility in software development 
organizations created by dynamic capability (see Lyytinen et al 2004). 
Though agile method studies offer useful guidelines how to increase software 
development speeds and increase its economic impact (i.e. the software meets better 
customers needs) these analyses are limited in explicating how increased process speed and 
changes in organizational and technological environments are related. In most studies this 
relationship looks like a form technological determinism:  because we have better and more 
flexible technology this will automatically result in faster development (Carsten and 
Vogelsang 1999).  Sometimes claims are made that new markets demand faster development 
irrespective of the technological environment (Cusumano and Yoffie 1999).  As a result we 
currently have poor theoretical explanations how software agility has changed over time, and 
how varying speeds in different processes relate to technological / environmental change. For 
example to what extent observed changes are strategic choices made by the management to 
adapt to a market niche / competitive ecology? To what extent the speed is an outcome of 
better technological capability?  In order to analyze these issues we need to carefully analyze 
how IT drives innovation in software development and how such innovation relates to agility. 
To this end we will next formulate fragments of a theory of software development agility. It 
draws on the concept of IT innovation and March’s model of organizational learning. 
 
Model of IS Innovation 
In the IS field, the concept of  IT innovation is poorly developed despite a huge 
literature on IT based  innovation (Swanson 1994. Lyytinen and Rose 2003b).  One reason 
for this is the inherent difficulty IS scholars face in addressing what innovation means in the 
IS field. Currently, it means many things to many men. IT innovation has multiple sources 
and a such broad scope that covers a broad range of activities in the IT value chain (Swanson 
1994). As a consequence, innovation within system development (like agility) is not a 
singular event, but subsumes a causal chain of events along the value chain which portray 
significant departures from existing practices. An IS innovation must often traverse through a 
complex ecology of  multiple types of  innovative events (Figure 1) (Swanson 1994, Grover 
et al 1997, Lyytinen and Rose 2003a,b).  
Figure 1 shows three primary value adding activities in the IT domain: 1) creation of 
IT base technologies  like operating systems, middleware, databases systems etc. by vendors 
and manufacturers (e.g. Intel, Microsoft, IBM). This is called  here base innovation (Type 0 
innovation), 2) development of processes, technologies and organizational arrangements by 
software developers that enable better or more reliable delivery of software systems  in 
organizational contexts (called type I innovation), and 3) and development and adoption of  
new types of IT solutions by IT deploying companies (e.g. Amazon.com). This is called type 
II innovation. Arrows in Figure 1 show thus how downstream organizations adopt 
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innovations produced and innovated by companies in the upstream as to increase their overall 
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Figure 1. IT value chain and realms of IS innovation 
 
IT innovation in light of this model means multiple things (Lyytinen and Rose 2003): 
breakthroughs in computing capability and architectures (Type 0 innovation), departures in 
current ways to develop and design computing applications (Type I innovation), or novel 
applications and/or ways of applying them (Type II innovation). For example, most of the 
past software  agility research has focused on formulating and adopting type I innovations as 
a result of demand for increased speed from IS deploying organizations (pull) and availability 
of  new technological capability (type 0 innovations) (push). This connection is not causal in 
a sense that many innovation in type II do not necessarily affect other parts of the value 
chain. The case for such type 0 innovations is much rarer but still possible. The value chain  
model also suggests that innovations can take place in any part of the value chain  and by 
doing so they can affect other innovations upstream or downstream3. 
 Due to the technology dependent nature of IS innovation, software organizations 
adopting significant Type 0 and I innovations together can often produce radically new 
applications (Type II). In situations like this, software organizations take part in disruptive IS 
innovation (Lyytinen and Rose 2003a) where change both in processes and development 
outcomes is pervasive and radical. These disruptions are by necessity outcomes of radical 
breaks in the IT base, when components in the computing base are re-assembled in novel 
ways (Henderson and Clark 1990). As identified in Lyytinen and Rose (2003a, 2003b), 
Internet computing was an example of a disruptive innovation created by (Type 0) 
architectural change (TCP/IP-based tools and n-tier computing) which was made radical with 
the addition of browsers, data formatting standards and software platforms (J2EE, .Net, etc.). 
This enabled the development of radically new services (type II) which were demanded in 
faster speed (Type I).    
This model  helps investigate the extent to which changes in computing capability 
(Type 0) can and will lead to innovations in the development activities (Type I) like agile 
development, and the consequent fast  adoption of novel applications (Type II 
innovation/agility).  We conjecture that the innovation capability in and for agility is 
produced by two combined capabilities: 1) the capability of software organizations to adopt 
Type 0 innovations, and 2) their capability to successfully transform and hone these new 
capabilities into Type I innovations like agile development. This transformation is dependent 
                                                          
3 Swanson (1994) calls these strong and weak order effects.  
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on the mobilization of two capacities. The first capability -- technology absorbtion -- reflects 
an organization’s ability to efficiently sense, acquire and absorb new base technologies and to 
deploy them effectively (Srinivasan et al. 2002) through exploration. The second capability 
of process trransformation is reflected in a software organization’s: (1) ability to use 
occasions of new IT deployment for process improvement;  and (2) to effectively learn from 
such occasions as to standardize and formalize process knowledge into complementary assets 
that can be mobilized for fast development. This latter process we call exploitation. In other 
words, succesful software process innovators need to effectively and continuously identify 
and match the strategic opportunities  for their process improvement with the emerging 
computing capabilities.4  
  
Exploration and Exploitation 
In the management literature, the concepts of exploration and exploitation have been 
established as two fundamental modes organizational response to environmental challenge 
(March 1991). These archetypes of organizational learning help managers and scholars alike 
to distinguish two modes in which organizations compete and adapt, and which draw upon 
very distinct logics of how to organize, strategize or execute.  Through exploitation 
organizations garner and refine in trial and error learning their competencies through repeated 
actions over extended periods of time (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, March and Levinthal 1993). Exploitation is thus about 
harnessing “old certainties” and implies behaviors that are labeled as refinement, 
implementation, efficiency, production and selection. Exploration, in contrast, is about 
discovering new opportunities whereby organizations search and create new competences  by 
engaging in second loop learning (Christensen 1997, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Henderson 
and Clark 1990, March 1991, Tushman and Anderson 1986, Winter and Szulanski 2001).  
Exploration involves behaviors labeled as search, discovery, experimentation, risk taking and 
innovation. Exploration and exploitation are like water and fire (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998, 
Tushman and Anderson 1986): they require substantially different structures, processes, 
strategies, capabilities and culture. Exploration leans towards organic structures, loose 
couplings, improvisation, chaos and emergence. Exploitation deals with mechanistic 
structures, tight coupling, routinization, bureaucracy and stability. Returns with exploration 
are uncertain, highly variable and distant in time, while exploitation yields returns that are 
short term, have higher certainty and lower variance (March 1991, Levinthal and March 
1993).   
Due to their fundamental differences (March 1991, Mezias and Glynn 1993), 
exploration and exploitation pose a continuous tension for management (Gibson and 
Birkshaw 2004, He and Wong 2004). On one hand, exploitation fosters inertia and reduces 
capacity to adapt and seize new opportunities. On the other hand, exploration slows down the 
speed in which existing competencies can be improved (March 1991). These tensions create 
often dysfunctional learning outcomes when either exploration or exploitation is one-sidedly 
preferred (March 1991, Levinthal and March 1993). Trial and error learning and successful 
adaptation through exploitation can bias management to focus too much on current 
capabilities- at the expense of new opportunities- thus causing current capacities to become 
core “rigidities”. Such constant search for short term efficiencies leads to learning myopias 
and competency traps (Levitt and March 1988). In contrast, when organizations engage in 
excessive exploration continued “failure leads to search and change, which lead failure which 
                                                          
4 Note that Figure 2 emphasizes that radical innovation is not a product of one-way communication from ISD 
organizations to their clients. Our model recognizes that there is a combination of supply/push and demand/pull 
mechanisms and that ISD organizations engaged in radical innovation can be effective at either or both active 
pushing or reactive sensing of client demands and environmental pressures. 
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lead to even more search and so on” (Levinthal and March 1993). In such situations 
organizations’ learning becomes random and chaotic: managers love to explore and but fail to 
allocate resources to exploit their new competencies. 
Due to the threat of competency traps an increased attention has been paid in 
understanding how organizations learn to tack effectively between exploration and 
exploitation by changing their resource bases through acquisition, integration, re-
combination, and the removal of capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Lant and Mezias 
1992). In doing so (software) organizations must relentlessly integrate, reconfigure, gain and 
release resources in order to respond to swift changes (D'aveni 1994, Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000, Teece et al. 1997). A (software) organization’s dynamic capability thus embodies a 
learning related meta-capability by which this organization learns to effectively blend 
exploration and exploitation across different stages of technology innovation. In other word, 
software organizations must learn to both explore and exploit with multiple IT innovations 
across the IT innovation value chain. These distinct moments of innovation have differential 
impacts how agility is perceived and defined.  
 
Exploration and Exploitation in Software Development Organizations 
In the context of IT innovation software organizations’ agility is determined by their 
capability to both explore and imagine emerging needs and match them with the observed 
technology potential, and then to exploit these product innovations by improving their 
product delivery capability. The general logic of exploration and exploitation during IT 
innovation stages is depicted in figure 2. Exploration processes result in adopting new type 0 
base innovations that enable organizations to produce both type II and type I innovations. An 
example of type II innovations would be the organizations’ capability to create a capability to 
produce totally new types of applications, while the innovation of type I would be adopting 
new process technologies that help deliver the same software functionality in half of the time, 










































Figure 2. A general model of IT innovation as exploration and exploitation 
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During exploration agility means two things which both must be managed well: 1) the 
software organization must adopt new type 0 and I technologies faster than its peers, and 2) 
the organization must use these technologies to develop faster type II innovations, if such 
need arises in the market (explorative process innovation). The organizations’ capability to 
address these needs is clearly dependent on the firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1991). If the organization is successful in the exploration this will lead to changes 
in the organizations’ innovation base in that both its product (the type of applications, type II 
innovations) and the process (the way in which it develops these type II innovations) will 
change. The more the former deviates from the current product mix, the more innovative in 
content is the change- one can say that organizations is agile in its product innovation. The 
more the latter deviates from the current process the more innovative process is instantiated 
for software delivery- one can say that the software organization is agile in its process 
improvement. Normally, changing the process in itself is not a goal per se but it is evaluated 
in terms of how it contributes to improvements in the innovative content, quality, risk or 
speed. 
Software organizations need also exploit while products and technologies mature by 
streamlining, standardizing, automating, scaling up their processes as to gain better control. 
They must rely on their exploitation capability, which can be defined as the organizations’ 
learning capability to improve and change their delivery processes over time as to maximize 
desired process outcomes including speed, quality, risk or cost. Clearly, this learning mode 
and associated organizing logics are distinct from exploration tasks that focus on innovative 
content. Agility can be rather defined as lubricating a well-defined process- not how fast such 
processes can be revamped and replaced. 
We can now formulate a model how exploration and exploitation are organized 
across different phases of IT innovation (figure 3). We will use this model later to 
explore how each phase (1-4) affects process features like agility or cost. In this model 
Type 0 innovations can be regarded as “technology push” which seeks to improve and 
expand both software products and processes. Growth in this innovation base can lead 
to radical IT innovations (significant departures of existing behaviors and solutions) 
covering both development outcomes (new kinds of systems i.e. product innovations) 
and development process (new way of developing systems) that enable new innovative 
solutions and processes. Such explorations take place in quite short and intense periods 
during which hyper-competition and fast learning are valued5 (Phase 1). When main 
features of the new product family have been fixed and become more or less 
standardized organizations move to product exploitation by incrementally adding new 
features to the developed product platform (Phase 2). When such a stage is achieved 
organizations (or sometimes when organizations are doing product explorations) move 
to discover significant and radical ways to improve their product delivery processes. 
This stage we call process exploration or type I radical innovation (Phase 3). Such 
innovations can include investments in better cross-product platforms, or development 
of innovative process technologies (CASE tools, software libraries, collaborative tools). 
When the radical innovation potential in the process improvements is mostly exhausted 
the organizations will move to process exploitation what we call process exploitation or 
incremental type I innovation (Phase 4). 
                                                          
5 We call this hyperlearning in Lyytinen et al (2004). 
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Figure 3. Organizing logics for exploration and exploitation across different types of IT 
innovations 
 
A Model of Process Features During Exploration and Exploitation 
Relationships between desirable process features like innovative content, speed, 
cost, quality and risk are complex across innovation phases. Clearly these dependencies 
vary across different phases of IT based exploration and exploitation. In general it is 
impossible to maximize all of them simultaneously and the relationships between them 
are different during exploration phase where new type II innovations are discovered or 
incremental type I innovation where additional process steps are proposed.  In general,  
process features across stages (or organizations) can be modeled as directed graphs 
where each process feature is depicted as a separate dimension to be optimized and 
where the relative size of the vector shows to what extent this process feature is being 
maximized during this stage6. An example of such a graph is shown in figure 4 below 
for a situation that is typical for radical product exploration (phase1). It suggests that 
during product exploration software organizations seek to maximize innovative content, 
they tolerate relatively high risks, expect relatively fast product development and 
medium cost, but do not aspire for high quality. In short, the software processes in 
which organizations engage maximize innovative content (exploration depth and 
breadth) and speed, while tolerating higher risks and costs by sacrificing quality. 
 
                                                          
6 In van Kleijnen (1980) these are called Kiwiat graphs. 
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Figure 4.  Desirable process features for product exploration 
 
 
The features influence causally one another during each stage- but differently. During 
product exploration organizations seek to maximize innovative content and exploration 
processes thus suggesting the following relationships:  
 
For Innovative Content7: 
(1) + Innovative Content   + Risk (i.e. when innovative content increases risk 
increases) 
(2) + Innovative Content  + Cost 
(3) + Innovative Content  - Quality 
(4) + Innovative Content  - Speed 
 
Simultaneously, if speed is a requirement, it must come at the expense of other 




(1) + Speed  + Risk 
(2) + Speed  + Cost 
(3) + Speed  - Quality 
(4) + Speed  - Innovative Content 
 
As can be seen from these relationships, speed and innovation take precedence over the 
other factors.  However, both cannot be optimized simultaneously and an increase in 
one counteracts the other. 
To phrase these observations in other way:  during product exploration organizations 
must be willing to face higher risks and cost. They must also speed up their exploration speed 
but despite this improvement their capability to deliver any workable solution may be slowed 
down. If they want to be more nimble they will also incur higher cost, face higher risks and 
may have to sacrifice their innovativeness.  
                                                          
7 These causal dependencies were derived through content analysis from our interview data which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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We can in a similar fashion model the desirable process features for incremental 
process innovation (pure focus on exploitation, phase 4)8. Its goal graph is shown in Figure 5. 
The graph shows that organizations in this stage seek to maximize quality and speed while 
minimizing their cost and risk. They do so by fixing most of their product and process 
features. Such process goal combination is typical for relatively mature and well-defined 
software markets. This goal structure has been assumed in a majority of the process 
improvement research (see e.g. Humphrey 1989). In this situation cost reduction, increased 
quality, risk avoidance, and increased speed dominate at the expense of innovation.  We 
observe the following causal dependencies as a result: 
 
(1) - Innovative Content   - Risk (i.e. when innovative content decreases risk decreases) 
(2) - Innovative Content  - Cost 
(3) - Innovative Content  + Quality 



























Figure 5. Process features in type I incremental innovation 
 
In general software delivery speed in exploitation is faster than in exploration as time 
is not wasted to explore product features or architectural solutions. Instead, the focus is on 
incremental innovations that can deliver significant improvements through economies of 
scale and scope. 
 
Some Implications for The Study of Agility and Process Improvement 
Per March’s theory, if an organization engages in radical type II innovation, it will 
decrease its opportunity for incremental process innovations (exploitation) due to their 
contradicting logics. Likewise increases in organizations’ exploration efforts will decrease 
their current exploitation capability. From this follows that organizations focusing primarily 
either on exploration or exploitation- though both view agility as a desirable feature – have 
quite different mindsets about agility.  
During exploration an organization’s desire is to explore fast and build up new 
products that are shown to work, while during the exploitation their main focus is to remove 
friction from their well-defined processes and to utilize current process capabilities to the 
                                                          
8 We could mode similarly the two other phases but for the brevity they are omitted here as they are not as 
distinct as the two extreme cases. 
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fullest. It is important to note, however (as shown in figure 3) that the new technology 
potential (type 0) per se can dramatically increase the speed of development by offering 
tasks with higher granularity (e.g. ERP parametrization vs. implementing code to meet 
specific requirements), using powerful abstraction mechanisms (e.g. Web services), utilizing 
highly standardized functionalities (e.g. relational databases systems or browser based user 
interface),  standardizing architectural integration mechanisms (E.g. solution and architectural 
patterns).  Improvements through such mechanisms can be dramatic and be as important as 
radical innovations in products. Yet, in the early stages of exploration the process 
improvement potential is never exhausted and the fast product innovations take place with the 
additional cost of decreased quality and higher cost/risk.  
When an organization shifts its focus from radical IT innovation it must increase its 
exploitation effort. It will rather emphasize fixing the product qualities and later on the 
process qualities. This requires it to change key process measures as its main focus will now 
be on efficiency, economies of scale, and standardized development outcomes (quality 
control). Hence organizations’ interest changes over time from innovative content and 
exploration speed to process cost, speed and quality. This shift will lead to increased reliance 
on trial and error learning in contrast to generative learning that enables to establish causally 
effective routines to utilize technology potential (March and Levinthal 1993).  
As shown in figure 3, due to the structural and time disjuncture between exploration 
and exploitation and due to their contrasting logics (the left hand side vs. the right hand side 
of figure 3) software organizations innovate with IT in lumpy manner.  They need to 
continually balance tradeoffs between innovative content, cost, speed, quality, and risk and 
arrange accordingly in contradicting ways how they exploit technologies, organize processes 
and control outcomes. The IT innovations are moreover influenced by different learning 
outcomes at each phase, and they are “pulled” by diverse market signals. Therefore, each 
innovation in the IT base will be “appropriated” through multiple “different” innovation paths 
as shown in figure 3.  During these processes the organizations will adapt their strategies and 
goals while the technology changes leading to diverse product innovations and different 
market environments, which gradually shift their focus from exploration to exploitation. 
Because the contrast between early exploration and late exploitation is deep and stark 
software organizations must transform themselves while innovating in a stepwise manner. 
They can only entertain only a certain amount of transformations over a time period (if they 
want to do so).  As a result organizations normally follow staggered adoption and learning 
patterns: they continue to increase their innovative agility first by adopting radically new 
technologies (type 0), but later on shift their focus on exploitation by stabilizing product 
features and then seeking to stabilize process features. At the same time they may engage 
already in other exploration / exploitation cycle thus organizing their capabilities in 
ambidextrous manner (Tushman and Anderson 1986).  
The impact of organizational transformation on critical process features- innovative 
content, quality, risk and cost- is significant. The concern for agility is not the same at all 
times. Agility in absorbing technologies dominates in the early exploration as a result of 
radical innovation, and later on it is about introducing incremental changes in the product 
delivery process. Overall software organizations need to locate themselves into alternative 
exploration / exploitation regions during the diffusion. Each region offers a different concept 
of agility. The main positions of alternative regions are outlined in table 1 depending on 
whether the software organization places its efforts on the left or right side of the figure 3 
(exploration vs. exploitation focus).  
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Normally natural monopoly; Little 
impact on any process features 
Pre-competitive product development: 
Innovative content dominates, other 
features tangential 




Process Competition in 
established markets: 
Incremental changes in speed, 
efficiency focus in reducing risk, 
quality 
Internet computing 2001- 
Hypercompetition: Fluid technology 
and markets Speed dominates, necessary 
to meet minimal process / product 
features 
 
Internet computing 1996-2001 
  
 Table 1. Contingencies for organizational learning in software development 
 
The first contingency where both types of learning is low is rare and can be mostly 
observed in state controlled and bureaucratic software development environments. When 
only exploration focus is high this can be considered typical R & D software development 
(pre-competitive phase) where the development speed for the final product does not count 
much (most academic software development). When both exploration and exploitation is high 
(i.e. organizations are fast oscillating between two phases of product innovation in figure 3) 
this can be regarded a case of hyper-competition.  This was typically observed in new 
economy software development organizations between1997-2000 and the related learning 
condition is defined as hyper-learning in Lyytinen et al (2004). The simultaneous push to 
both high exploration and high product exploitation arose from huge unexplored technology 
potential and its potentially disruptive nature. It was expected to change businesses based on 
new software products and processes. The push towards higher levels of exploitation comes 
normally from heightened competitive demands created by the growing market size stiffer 
competition, alternative economies of scope, and new value propositions. When this happens 
the organizations focus tilts towards process improvements and organizations start compete 
based on their process integration and management capability. In general, we can observe 
that agility in software organizations relates either to organizations’ capability to be fast 
explorers and innovators or to be effective process integrators i.e. to improve their capability 
to integrate and manage delivery processes within expected cost and quality.  The shift 
between these positions happens when software organizations recognize that the so-far 
“emerging” technology potential has become mainstream, and its impacts on the market 
structure is significant. In this situation they must decide whether they will shift their focus 
on specific new markets that value exploration (increase innovative content) or whether they 
need to specialize on exploitation, where they need to control process features like reliability 
and cost efficient delivery.  
In light of this model we wanted to explore the following questions: 1) do perceptions 
of and need for agility change during different phases of IT innovation?; 2)  how software 
organizations manage contradicting demands of exploration and organize their innovation for 
agility? 3) does the IT innovation model help to predict how agility is perceived in relations 
to other process features?  
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Research Method and Research Sites 
 
Research Goals and Design 
We conducted a five-year longitudinal field study (Yin 1994) in a theoretical sample 
of Web development software companies (March et al 2001) to address the above questions. 
We chose multi-site case study as it allowed a replication logic by which we could test 
emerging theoretical insights in different contexts and triangulate both theory and data 
(Eisenhardt 1989, Strauss and Corbin 1990)9.  
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hundred 
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by teams (of 
10 each) 
 
Table 2. Firm characteristics 
                                                          
9 The “Web- development” refers to computing applications that utilize Internet browsers, such as Netscape or 
Microsoft Internet Explorer, and a set of open standards and protocols that include XML, HTML, http, 
URL, TCP/IP, combined with the extensive use of middleware architectures in leveraging the computing 
service.  
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We identified seven companies that met the following criteria: (1) they were 
developing Web-based systems; (2) they were recognized by their peers as fast adopters of 
the most advanced technologies available; and (3) they worked mostly for outside and 
leading edge clients through contractual relationships. To minimize bias we sought to 
maximize the variations in our sample that would improve external validity (Yin 1994). 
Companies had different sizes and operated in different industry sectors in terms of the 
services provided (ranging from manufacturing, financial services and public administration 
to retail and transportation). They had experience using Web-based technologies in several 
application domains (back office, front office, and inter-organizational applications). The 
geographical scope of their operations varied largely as some were local software firms while 
others were part of large global companies. The firms also had large variations in their 
software development experience, ranging from as few as four years to 40+ years. A 
summary of the firms’ characteristics is included in Table 2.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The data was gathered primarily between June 2000 and April 2003 at four different 
time points (2000, 2001, 2003-2004) from seven companies. The exact times and periods of 
data collection are shown in table 3. For all seven companies the data is not complete due to 
mortality (some of the companies went out of the business or were bought or sold). For some 
data sets we had problems with the poor quality of the tapes and could not transcribe them 
verbatim but instead just collect main facts. We organized the interview data into three 
different temporal periods: pre 2000 (Time 1), 2000-2001 (Time 2), and 2002-2004 (Time 3) 
that align well with the different stages of the dot-com boom.  Here pre 2000 stands for 
market growth and period of fast innovation driven by the ideas of new economy, period 200-
2001 stands for the recession and crisis, and 2002-2004 stands for the new recovery and 
modest growth of the markets.  
The data was obtained through semi-structured tape-recorded interviews with senior 
management and senior developers who made decisions about technology investments and 
were in charge of business strategy. The interviewees managed the organizational knowledge 
bases and skills needed to execute a chosen technology and business strategy. We also 
examined the archives of the company documents, including systems development 
documentations and technology strategies and made notes during the visits concerning their 
physical sites, personnel age, general atmosphere etc. A range of one to six individuals from 
each company participated in the study. A total of 19 interviews were conducted with a 
typical interview time of approximately two hours each. The transcribed data covers currently 
c.a. 2000 pages of interviews. The interviews reviewed the applications and solution 
portfolios provided by these companies to their clients and examined how they delivered 
these applications. We probed for changes taking place in the business and the technology 
domains of their operations as a result of Internet computing. Specifically, we asked the firms 
to clarify the extent, scope, depth and speed of changes in their software development 
practices when compared with their situation prior to the Web development and during 
different stages of its deployment. We further examined how these firms coped with changes 
in technology and markets. The interviews were transcribed and the summaries of these 
transcripts were sent to the companies for correction and validation.  
Data analysis was done using inductive method (Boyatzis 1998, Glasser and Strauss 
1967, Strauss and Corbin 1990). The transcripts of each company  for each time period was 
subject to a within-case analysis that involved repeatedly reading the transcript and taking 
thorough notes about firms’ perceptions of the competitive environments and their reactions 
to the environmental changes and their perceptions of agility and process features. After each 
individual case had been analyzed, we began cross-case comparisons that involved listing the 
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similarities and differences among the firms in process outcomes at each period of time. The 
results of the cross-case and cross-period comparisons provide a vivid picture of the ways in 
which companies tacked between exploration and exploitation and accordingly changed their 
process features. Furthermore, the results provide a consistent picture of how these 
organizations controlled agility in order to speed up either exploitation or exploration and 
how they configured accordingly their processes. 
 
FIRM Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 Firm 6 Firm 7 
Interview 
Date 1 
















one of his key 
developers 
The CIO, and the 
five key senior 
technologists who 
were responsible for 
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available.  Time 3 
information gathered 
via email with one 
of the original 
interviewees and 
review of online 
documentation of 
























Changes in Agility During Exploration and Exploitation 
Table 1 and Figure 3 suggest a movement from a product exploration to process 
exploitation among software organizations as they adopt a new technological base. A 
summary of the changes in focus in exploration v.s. exploitation in our firms through three 
observation points is given in Tables 4a and b.  As indicated therein, each of the firms in the 
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early stages of Internet computing (e.g., the periods between 1995 and the first interview 
[noted as Time 0 and Time 1]) were engaged in radical innovation product when compared to 
period 2.    
FIRM Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
Time 0 Phase 1: Product Exploration Phase 
 










Phase 2: Product Exploitation Phase 
 
Speed increase; risk increase; costs 
increase. Base technology is inherently 
faster in internet frame. 
Certain amount of freezing product 
innovation had already begun and allowed 
time reduction via reuse. 
 
Projected in Time 2 that they would focus 
on more reuse to increase time and 
decrease risk.  Indication was that they 
planned to freeze product innovation to 
allow this process innovation to occur. 
Phase 2: Product Exploitation Phase
 
No rigid methodologies.  Have 
faster development than before 
Internet development but deemed to 
be with poor quality.   
Phase 2: Product Exploitation Phase 
 
Spun off by parent company that focuses on 
methodologies and process exploitation.  
Recognized they were in a new environment 
and required radical product innovation.   
 
Quality required.  Speed faster than in the 
parent firm, but at 24 months to get a working 
product, it was considered unacceptably slow 
in “new economy.”  No formal process used. 
Lots of experimentation with product.  Product 
innovation was high, risks were high, quality 
was lower than the parent company standards.   
 
Just at that time planning on freezing product 
innovation and beginning radical process 
innovation.  Goal was to increase speed and 
quality.  Did so at high cost by buying outside 
help (grafting).  Goal is to stabilize and get 










Phase 3 Process Exploration Phase and 
then  
Phase 4: Circumstantial Process 
Exploitation Phase 
 
Speed not a problem because project 
scopes were smaller as client demand for 
product innovation stopped.   
Business dropped off significantly and 
required elimination of many programmers. 
 
Fired all slowest programmers and kept 
those with tacit understanding of effective 
methods (a Darwinian model).  
Combination of things allowed for rapid 
development, but not by design. They had 
methods as a result of market requirements 
and a natural selection of developers, not 
because they looked to have methods.   
Phase 3: Process Exploration Phase 
 
Compared to Time 1- faster still; 
costs lower; quality higher.  Fast 
learning stopped.  Process 
innovation occurred in Type I as a 
result of stability in Base IT and 
incremental innovation in base.   
Phase 3: Process Exploration Phase 
 
Product innovation frozen. Process innovation 
slowing down to almost frozen as well.  
Development speed was way up. Quality was 
better than in Time 1.  Stable base technology.  
Stabilized product. Stabilized process. Goal to 
shore up process methods to maintain high 








Phase 1: New Product Exploration Phase 
 
Speed for ISD still an issue but urgency 
around it gone. Looking into exploration in 
radical new Base and product innovations.  
Inherent in their mission statement (a single 
sentence about meeting client needs with 
leading-edge IT innovations). 
Phase 4: Process Exploitation Phase
 
Technology Base, processes and 
product solutions have matured and 
stabilized since Time 1 and Time 2.  
Speed up still as a result of: new 
Type I innovations; stability of 
solutions and knowledge sets; and 
reuse (stable base tools and 
incremental innovation in base). 
Phase 4: Process Exploitation Phase 
 
Innovation frozen entirely.  Quality very high, 
risks in ISD and costs in ISD approach zero.  
ISD firm is swallowed up by the parent 
company and leadership given to marketing 
team instead of it team.  Originally spun out of 
parent to innovate rapidly and radically.  Team 
disbanded in 2003 and frozen products and 
processes (methods) swallowed up. 
 
Table 4a.  Innovation summary (USA firms) 
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Six of the seven firms were responsible for their own product innovations and began 
period 0 (before the first interview time) as radical product innovators (Phase 1).  They then 
moved sequentially to Phase 4 during our observation period.  One firm (Firm 6) in our data 
set did not conduct their own product innovation though it engaged in Internet computing 
explorations.  Instead it formed alliances with other radical product innovators (thus 
outsourcing that activity) and focused all the time on process innovations. They sought to 
deploy the existing product bases as quickly as possible and thus were already in Phase 3 at 
Time 0. This they did at the cost of radical product innovation and they emphasized the need 
to control that activity. Not surprisingly, by period 1, Firm 6 was already engaged in process 
exploitation (Phase 4). 
 
FIRM Firm 4 Firm 5 Firm 6 Firm 7 
 
Time 0 
Phase 1: Product Exploration 
Phase 
 
Phase 1: Product Exploration 
Phase 
Phase 3: Process Exploration 
Phase 








Phase 2: Product Exploitation 
Phase then Phase 3: Process 
Exploration Phase 
 
Recognized the need for 
speed.  Believed a 
methodology would get them 
there. Began work on 
formalization of process at 
end of Time 1. 
 
Phase 2: Product Exploitation 
Phase 
 
Indicated there is a high risk 
associated with speed.  Used 
light methods with 
unknowable outcomes 
(because of less quality 
testing, less needs analysis) & 
limited scope of product 
innovations. 
Phase 4: Process Exploitation 
Phase 
 
First firm of the seven to limit 
to a fixed set of product 
innovation solutions.  
Therefore, had process 
innovations possible earliest.  
Mostly reuse of components, 
affiliation with partners, and 
reusable methodologies.  
Very high quality, low costs, 
and low risks because of fixed 
solutions. 
Phase 2: Product Exploitation 
Phase 
 
Speed increase; risk increase; 
costs increase.  Base 
technology is inherently 
faster in internet frame. 
Certain amount of freezing 
product innovation had 
already begun and allowed 







Phase 4: Process Exploitation 
Phase then a new Phase 1: 
Product Exploration Phase  
 
Methodologies implemented 
were for projects of Time 1 
type.  Time 2 projects were 
radically different and 
methods were wrong for 
them.  Cost rose and speed 
declined as a result of moving 
again toward product 
exploration phase 
Phase 3: Process Exploration 
Phase 
 
Moved to incremental product 
innovation stage.  Coincides 
with return of methodologies.
Phase 4: Process Exploitation 
Phase 
 
Nothing different from Time 
1 except perhaps even more 
focused on exploitation of 
product and process 
 
Phase 3: Process Exploration 
Phase 
 
Moved to incremental 
product innovation stage.  











Closed Finnish office. 
Phase 4: Process Exploitation 
Phase then a new Phase 1: 
Product Exploration Phase  
 
Speed slower again as product 
innovation becomes more 
radical again. Further problem 
when encounter changes in 
base innovations.  
Counteracted with process 
innovations. 
Phase 4: Process Exploitation 
Phase 
 
Nothing different from Time 
1 except perhaps even more 
focused on exploitation of 
product and process. 
 
Phase 4: Process Exploitation 
Phase 
 
Focused on more reuse to 
increase speed and decrease 
risk.  Freezing product 
innovation allowed this 
process innovation to have 
occurred. 
 
Table 4b.  Innovation summary (Finnish firms) 
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While each firm moved eventually to Phase 4, some of them moved beyond  Phase 4 
(or back) to a new Phase 1 by starting to seek new technology and solutions thus 
demonstrating the need for ambidexterity.  Each of the organizations found that they could 
not successfully continue to engage solely in process exploitation.  In the case of Firms 1 and 
5, they found that adopting radical Base innovations and creating radical product innovations 
made the process innovations they had developed during the previous cycle less effective.  
Notably, these two firms saw their development agility decrease notably and they needed to 
evaluate constantly tradeoffs between speed and other features.  Likewise, Firm 4 found that 
it now incurred higher costs and slower speeds.  This firm found this by period 2 and 
subsequently went out of business as a result of declined market demand and wrong 
capability set.  Overall our data set shows that organizations organized their perceptions of 
agility and concerns for exploration and exploitation as suggested by the IT innovation 
model. 
 
Impact on Process Features and Speed 
Figures 4 and 5 highlight critical interrelationships between ISD process features at 
different stages of exploration and exploitation.  As indicated in the figures, organizations 
must continuously control five interrelated and contradictory process features: speed; 
innovation; cost; risks; and quality.  Of the 19 interviews, we found strong evidence that 
these five factors were heeded by the organizations during each of the periods (see Tables 5a 
and b, and 6a and b for details).   
 




Evidence of tradeoffs between 
speed and quality, costs, and risks 
  
Evidence of increases in speed and 
decline in quality 
Evidence of tradeoffs between speed 
and quality, costs, and risks 
Evidence of tradeoffs 
between speed and quality, 
costs, and risks 
Time 2 Evidence of tradeoffs between 
speed and quality, costs, and risks 
Evidence of tradeoffs between speed 
and quality, costs, and risks 
Evidence of tradeoffs 
between speed and quality, 
costs, and risks 
Time 3 Evidence of tradeoffs between 
speed and quality, costs, and risks 
Evidence of tradeoffs between speed 
and quality, costs, and risks 
 
 
Table 5a. Tradeoffs between speed vs. quality, costs, and risks summary (USA firms) 
 
 




Evidence of tradeoffs 
between speed and 
quality, costs, and risks 
Evidence of tradeoffs 
between speed and 
quality, costs, and risks 
Evidence of 
tradeoffs between 
speed and quality, 
costs, and risks 
Evidence of tradeoffs 
between speed and quality, 
costs, and risks 
 
Time 2 
Evidence of tradeoffs 
between speed and 
quality, costs, and risks 
  Evidence of tradeoffs 
between speed and quality, 




 Evidence that slowing 
down development 
reduces costs and 
improves quality 
 Evidence of tradeoffs 
between speed and quality, 
costs, and risks  
 
 
Table 5b. Tradeoffs between speed vs. quality, costs, and risks summary (Finnish firms) 
 
Within the data set, we also found strong evidence for the types of interrelationships 
between the five goals as noted in Figures 4 and 5.  Specifically, we evinced that when 
organizations wanted to increase speed in innovation, they faced a tradeoff of increased risk, 
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increased cost, and decreased quality (see Tables 5a and b).   In 16 of the 19 interview 
transcripts, these tradeoffs were clearly observed by as the price for increased speed.  For 
example, a developer in Firm 1 indicated “because you(are) moving so fast through the whole 
thing, if you mess up somewhere it impacts you a whole lot more than it would have impacted 
you in a slower process.”  Likewise, a participant from Firm 7 noted, “you have less time to 
think and you don't have the time to think of everything.” The dominating desirable process 
feature in period 1 is innovation and we also observed that speed and innovation are inversely 
related.  Again, in 16 of the 19 interviews, evidence was found for the negative relationship 
between speed and innovation (as can be seen in bold in Tables 6a and b).   For example, 
Firm 3 finished their proof in concept stage of development and subsequently stopped radical 
product innovation.  As a result of moving to incremental innovation in Time 1, they were 
going to be able to formalize a methodology to enable the “rapid software development and 
rapid implementations that we have to do.”   Similarly, Firm 2 attributed increased speed in 
period 3 to the shift to incremental innovation in all three innovation types in Figure 1.  
Specifically, increased speed was a function of stabilization in “methodology [PROCESS], a 
function of increased skill sets [BASE], and a function of using packaged product type 
solutions [PRODUCT].” 
Likewise, the remaining relationships between innovation and the features of risks, 
cost, and quality were observed (as noted in the non-bolded data summaries in Tables 6a and 
b).  For example, in period 1, a member of Firm 7 referred to the period before the radical 
innovations associated with Internet development as “the good old days” and noted that 
lower risks were “old fashioned.”  Similarly, Firm 5 noted when it began adopting radical 
base innovations for creating radical innovations in period 3 (and thus entered a new phase 1 
period), development was slower, more resources needed to be allocated, and quality 
declined: 
 
“I already did miss the deadline and the resource allocation [target]… 
when there [have been] only just a couple of experts in certain [new base 
technology] and we needed to share the knowledge by allocating the people 
that were not in so big in that technology, it meant that also the amount of 
time and the amount of work used were exceeded but also the qualities 
probably not the best possible one when looking back at the acts or work.”  
 
 
FIRM Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
 
Time 1 




Evidence that more radical 
innovation increases risk
Evidence that if you freeze innovation, 
speed increases 









Evidence that if you freeze 
innovation, speed increases 
 
Evidence that if you freeze innovation, 
speed increases 
Evidence that if you freeze innovation, 
cost decreases 
Evidence that stopping radical innovation 









Evidence that if you freeze 
innovation, speed increases 
Evidence that stopping radical 




Table 6a. Tradeoffs of innovation vs. speed, quality, risk, or cost summary (USA firms) 
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Evidence that more 
radical innovation 
increases risk
Evidence that if you freeze 
innovation, speed increases 
Evidence that more radical 
innovation increases risk
 
Evidence that if you freeze 
innovation, speed increases  
Evidence that moving to 
incremental innovation 
improves quality 
Evidence that incremental 
innovation decreases risk
Evidence that if you 
freeze innovation, 
speed increases 









Evidence that if you freeze 
innovation, speed increases 
Evidence that stopping radical 
innovation allows improved 
quality deliverables 
Evidence that if you freeze 
innovation, speed increases 
Evidence that moving to 
incremental innovation 
improves quality







 Evidence that if you freeze 
innovation, speed increases 
Evidence that if you freeze 
innovation, costs decrease 
Evidence that moving to 
incremental innovation 
improves quality
Evidence that if you freeze 
innovation, speed increases  








Table 6b. Tradeoff of innovation vs. speed, quality, risk, or cost summary (Finnish firms) 
 
Collectively, the directional interrelationships of the five factors shown in Figures 4 
and 5 are supported.  With regards to phases, the primary relationships shown in Figures 4 
and 5 are also supported.  Figure 4 represents the desired tradeoffs made by a firm in product 
exploration (phase 1) and Figure 5 the desired tradeoffs made in the process exploitation 
phase (phase 4).  As can be seen in the data in Tables 4a and b, in earlier phases quality was 
lower, risks were higher, and costs were higher.  In later phases the opposite was true (note in 
all phases, speed was deemed as important and as such it does not show a differences 
between the figures, but the type of speed in some sense was different).   
The tradeoffs between innovation and the other factors are most evident when period 
1 is considered across the firms.  In period 1, Firm 6 was already in phase 3 (product 
exploitation).  They were already reaping the rewards of this phase and noted that quality was 
higher, costs were lower, and risks were lower because they had purposefully frozen 
innovation and were primarily engaged in assembly of “ready made components” and they 
had “a set of solutions that [they knew] how to give and [could] give them quickly.”  In 
contrast, the other firms were basically beginning phase 2 and all saw increased risks and 
costs, with decreased quality.   
As time moved on, and each of the firms moved into later phases their market needs 
matured ( in terms of Type II innovations and Type 0 innovations). Likewise their 
methodologies became more refined and they were implemented, while the risks, costs, and 
quality moved to the pattern of tradeoffs as shown in Figure 5.  For example, Firm 2 entered 
phase 4 in during period 3.  The interviewee noted in that interview that their “methodologies 
and strategies are now mature” and that quality was greatly improved as “a function of 
better trained people, a methodology,…and less innovation.” 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have developed a model of IT innovation which views it as an 
extended process of both exploration and exploitation across IT value chain. The model 
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predicts that software development speed/agility is not a universal goal within all phases of 
IT innovation. In contrast it is affected by the scope and depth of innovative activity in base 
technologies that offer new radical products and new types of software processes as well as in 
process innovations when complementary assets are garnered. To address the issue of 
development agility more thoroughly we conducted a multi-site longitudinal field study in 
seven software development organizations to address the following questions: 1) do 
perceptions of and need for agility and the type of agility change during different stages of IT 
innovation?; 2) how do software organizations manage contradicting demands of exploration 
and exploitation and how they organize their innovation for agility accordingly?; 3) does the 
model of exploration and exploitation help to predict how agility is perceived in the context 
of other process features?. We observed within our study: 1) concern for both exploration 
speed and process development speed changed significantly over the period of study; 2) 
software development organizations tended to organize themselves  differently during the 
study period and they changed from fast explorers to process integrators as technologies 
matured. Some organizations also positioned themselves as general explorers (agility in 
exploration) or generic process integrators (agility in integrating new technological solutions 
into existing generic development routines); and 3) the variance in agility in relation to 
process features varied across innovation phases and also between companies due to their 
differentiated focus on exploration or exploitation. 
In general software organizations control their agility in terms of how good they 
become in adopting disruptive technologies during different stages of innovation. They must 
constantly trade off agility against other criteria like risk, quality or innovative content. How 
these trade-offs are made depend on garnered organizational competencies, shifting 
managerial focus and new competitive demands. Over time organizations learned to locate 
themselves differently in this space (explorative players: agility primary focus, exploration 
main capability; process orchestrators: exploit new technology in large scale fast, use 
alliances, source knowledge, focus on process and integration skills).  These competitive 
niches had quite different business logics and managers interpreted differently what “agility” 
meant.  
There are several avenues for future research in this fascinating area. First we need to 
generalize the findings here with better and more representative sample of organizations. 
There is also a need to develop more careful constructs for agility and other process features. 
We need to also explore other factors than just the organizations’ learning focus to establish 
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